Niger Uranium Claim is Back, but Still Pretty Thin.

This is the Financial Times article that makes a desperate attempt to revive the Niger Uranium claim.  This is perhaps one of the crappies articles that I've read in a while.  The basic strategy here is to provide a bunch of really bad circumstantial (at best) evidence, and then suggest a bunch of outlandish interpretations that might actually support the Niger contention. 
 
Let's have a look at some of the stupidest points made.  We don't have to look too far because the article opens with this:
 

"When thieves stole a steel watch and two bottles of perfume from Niger's embassy on Via Antonio Baiamonti in Rome at the end of December 2000, they left behind many questions about their intentions.

The identity of the thieves has not been established. But one theory is that they planned to steal headed notepaper and official stamps that would allow the forging of documents for the illicit sale of uranium from Niger's vast mines".

 
Well, that would explain why the documents in question were crappy forgeries.  The problem is that we'd have to make a lot of leaps in reasoning here.  I mean, clearly these documents weren't of that great of quality, and people didn't come to this conclusion because of the stationary. My point is that if these guys were actually trying to pull off some sort of scam, and they wanted things to appear totally legit, you would think that the Niger official's name appearing on the document wouldn't be someone who had been dead prior to the dating of the forged document.  If they're willing to sweat the small stuff like making sure that the stationary is legit, you would think that they would try and avoid mistakes like this one too.  Second, are we supposed to believe that it's more difficult to counterfiet stationary than currency.  I realize that there is some very intricate stationary out there, but I know where Kinko's is.  I would seriously try to duplicate it on my own rather than break into an embassy.  Would you really risk the undoing of your international crime syndacate on a burglary that isn't really necessary? The claim about the watch and the perfume is odd too.  I guess we're supposed to believe that this sophisticated international crime ring just refuses to go away empty handed.  I can totally see some crack-head going into a pawn shop and trying to unload a watch, two bottles of perfume and a bunch of uranium. 
 
Here's another one:
 

The raw intelligence on the negotiations included indications that Libya was investing in Niger's uranium industry to prop it up at a time when demand had fallen, and that sales to Iraq were just a part of the clandestine export plan. These secret exports would allow countries with undeclared nuclear programmes to build up uranium stockpiles.

 
One nuclear counter-proliferation expert told the FT: "If I am going to make a bomb, I am not going to use the uranium that I have declared. I am going to use what I acquire clandestinely, if I am going to keep the programme hidden."

All this claim says is that Niger would like to sell uranium on the black market to countries; it says nothing about whether or not Iraq was interested. The weakness of this claim is evident by the inclusion of this quote. Notice how it's couched entirely in conditional terms, so unless Iraq is developing a hidden program, this statement is pretty much meaningless.  Of course, whether or not Iraq was trying to build a bomb is the point in question.  What the author is really trying to do with the inclusion of this statement is, I think, confuse the readers by conflating opportunity with intent (i.e. Iraq could buy illicit uranium from Niger, therefore they wanted to buy illicit uranium from Niger). 
 
Then there's this one:
 

Information gathered in 1999-2001 suggested that the uranium sold illicitly would be extracted from mines in Niger that had been abandoned as uneconomic by the two French-owned mining companies - Cominak and Somair, both of which are owned by the mining giant Cogema - operating in Niger.

 
"Mines can be abandoned by Cogema when they become unproductive. This doesn't mean that people near the mines can't keep on extracting," a senior European counter-proliferation official said.

He added that there was no evidence the companies were aware of the plans for illicit mining.

All this proves is that an illicit uranium mining program is possible, but I wasn't aware that this was a contested point.  I thought we were talking about whether or not Iraq was trying to purchase any illicitly mined uranium, which is an entirely different point.  Again, the author is try to conflate opportunity with intent. 
 
Last, but not least:
 

Mr Wilson was critical of the Bush administration's use of secret intelligence, and has since charged that the White House sought to intimidate him by leaking the identity of his wife, Valerie Plame, as a CIA agent.

 
But Mr Wilson also stated in his account of the visit that Mohamed Sayeed al-Sahaf, Iraq's former information minister, was identified to him by a Niger official as having sought to discuss trade with Niger.

As Niger's other main export is goats, some intelligence officials have surmised uranium was what Mr Sahaf was referring to.

This is the only piece of "evidence" that actually says anything about what Iraq was actually doing.  Everything else was about what Niger wanted to do with Iraq--, that is, sell them illicit uranium (and maybe some anal), but there's nothing to indicate whether or not Iraq was receptive or not.  Enter this crap-tacular claim.  Of course, it's all predicated on this inference about how they must have been talking about uranium, but we know that this is pretty dubious.  Sure, Niger's main exports are goats and uranium, but it doesn't follow that they are Niger's only exports.